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We address a crucial but underappreciated question: what else besides
corporate law matters for corporate governance? We take the novel view that
corporate governance must involve more than corporate law. Corporate
scholars focus almost exclusively on corporate law mechanisms for controlling
managerial agency costs. We contend, however, that contracting parties also
attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm. In particular,
we hypothesize that banks, by monitoring firms in connection with their loans,
enhance firm value for the benefit of shareholders.
We examine over one-thousand public firms for the period 1990-2004 to test
the value of bank monitoring. Our approach builds on existing empirical
scholarship on corporate governance, to which we add data on the presence of
bank loans and their interactions with free cash flow, governance indices, and
individual corporate governance provisions. We find evidence consistent with
our hypothesis that bank monitoring improves firm value, especially where
agency costs are high. Bank monitoring may provide an additional mechanism
for corporate governance.
Our findings have important implications for both regulatory design and
corporate governance. Bank monitoring may offer positive spillovers not
previously considered in the crafting of regulation affecting bank lending,
creditor rights, and the operation of loan and credit derivatives markets.
Legal rules affecting bank lending or monitoring may indirectly and
inadvertently affect firm value, a nontrivial consideration given the
pervasiveness of bank debt among public companies. We identify a number of
regulatory areas that may deserve new attention. Similarly, future empirical
corporate governance research should account for the effects of bank
governance, as well as investigate further its potential for improving firm
value.
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[C]reditor control has yet to hit the radar screen of the general corporate
governance literature. 1
INTRODUCTION
Corporate law matters. But it may not be all that matters.
Several decades of empirical research have generated consensus that good
governance improves firm value, thereby benefiting public company
shareholders.2 Corporate law may not be the only thing that matters, though.
Other parties besides shareholders care about controlling managerial agency
costs. Contracting parties of the firm may therefore be expected to contract for
agency cost constraints and to monitor management. A well-developed
finance literature shows banks to be especially adept at this monitoring
function. And while the interests of banks and shareholders may not be
perfectly aligned, we hypothesize that the overlap is sufficiently large that
bank monitoring may improve firm value for the benefit of shareholders. We
seek to address a yawning gap in the corporate governance literature, which to
date has largely ignored the prospects and possibilities for creditor governance.
Our empirical analysis of publicly traded U.S. firms for the period 1990-2004
supports our hypothesis that bank monitoring adds value for shareholders.
Corporate law scholars have long assumed that corporate law does and
should take the laboring oar for improving firm value and shareholder returns.
Moreover, two decades of empirical research confirms that good governance
adds value for shareholders. Researchers began by examining the effect of
specific governance arrangements – poison pills, golden parachutes, or the
composition of boards of directors, for example – on firm performance and
shareholder wealth. 3 Building on these early efforts, subsequent empirical
scholarship has attempted to capture the broad contours of firms’ governance
structures with multi-factor governance indices. 4 An index identifies particular
governance provisions of interest and then scores firms based on the presence
or absence of these provisions in firms’ governance arrangements. Broadindex approaches – tracking dozens of specific governance provisions – have
led to narrow-index approaches, attempting to identify a relative handful of
governance provisions that matter.5
Corporate law scholars have generally not looked much beyond corporate
law and markets for mechanisms to reduce agency costs. They have largely

1

Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1242 (2006).
2
See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance
and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 144 (2003) (finding a relationship between an index
of corporate governance measures and stock performance during the 1990s).
3
See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
4
See Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 109.
5
See infra Part I.A.
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ignored the possibility that creditor monitoring might improve public company
firm value.6 While a few scholars have examined creditor monitoring, they
focus primarily on the distress context – creditors’ ability to affect corporate
governance once the firm is in serious trouble. Our claim is broader. We
believe bank monitoring has more general value for firms even outside the
narrow default context.
The dearth of attention from corporate scholars is ironic given the
ascendancy of the contractualist view of the corporation within the legal
academy and the thick web of contractual commitments that bind the public
company.7 Stockholders are not the only claimants on the firm concerned
about managerial slack. Other contracting parties have reason to worry about
agency costs. It makes sense, therefore, to investigate the possibility of
contractual governance arrangements – institutional monitoring arrangements
outside the traditional purview of corporate law created by explicit contract. It
should not be surprising if a firm’s contracts include devices for monitoring
management and otherwise constraining agency costs. Corporate governance
may involve more than corporate law. We investigate firms’ bank debt to see
whether this might be true.
Banks look to be an especially promising source of monitoring services for
shareholders. A well-developed finance literature explains banks’ special
monitoring abilities.8 Largely apart from the shareholder-focused empirical
corporate governance literature, finance scholars have pursued another line of
research exploring financial intermediation and its positive externalities for
other financial claimants. 9 Of special interest to us, studies imply that bank
loans benefit the borrower firm’s shareholders. Event studies have consistently
found positive abnormal stock returns to borrower firms upon the public
announcement of bank loans. 10 One explanation for this stock price effect is
6
Law scholars have extensively analyzed the role of banks in the governance of small
firms. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 901, 903-04 (1986).
7
George Triantis and Ron Daniels offer a prominent exception. They raised the
possibility over a decade ago that a bank lender’s monitoring of its borrower firm might
benefit the firm’s claimants generally. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The
Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1113 (1995).
Only recently have other law scholars begun to follow this lead, focusing on the effects of
creditor control on corporate governance. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at
1212 (discussing the central role of loan covenants in corporate governance).
8
See infra Part I.B.2.
9
See, e.g., Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta & Ajay Patel, Bank Monitoring and the
Pricing of Corporate Public Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 435, 448 (1999) (finding empirical
evidence that bank debt significantly lowers the monitoring costs of arms-length debt);
Mark S. Klock, Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell, Does Corporate Governance
Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITIVE ANALYSIS 693, 694 (2005).
10
See Ronald Best & Hang Zhang, Alternative Information Sources and the Information
Content of Bank Loans, 48 J. FIN. 1507, 1512 (1993); Matthew T. Billett, Mark J. Flannery
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that banks perform a monitoring function not otherwise available. Because
shareholders value this bank monitoring, they bid up the price of the firm’s
stock.11
Despite the findings of these studies and the intensive empirical focus on
corporate governance, to date no study has attempted to measure effects of
bank debt on firm value, or to investigate the interaction of ongoing bank
monitoring with traditional corporate governance arrangements.
We
hypothesize that if bank monitoring explains at least part of the observed
positive market reaction to bank loan announcements, then we should observe
improved firm value as a result of bank monitoring. We also suspect that bank
monitoring may interact with certain corporate governance features, either
complementing or substituting for good corporate governance. Finance
theorists noted long ago the various agency costs that different financial claims
may create.12 It makes sense, therefore, that financial claimants may attempt to
control agency costs in their contracts with firms. And while finance theorists
often emphasize the conflicting interests among different types of financial
claims,13 surely debt and equity must share some interest in reducing
managerial slack. We hypothesize that over a wide range of situations, the
interests of lenders and equity holders may converge in reducing managerial
agency costs. In short, bank monitoring may provide value for shareholders.
How might bank monitoring control agency costs? The standard loan
agreement imposes numerous operating and financial constraints on the
borrower firm. 14 The borrower is also typically required to maintain a regular
flow of information to the bank, detailing the borrower’s operating
performance and current financial condition. In addition to these contractual
& Jon A. Garfinkel, The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm’s Equity Return, 50
J. FIN. 699, 717 (1995); Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank
Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 234 (1987); Myron B. Slovin, Shane A. Johnson & John L.
Glascock, Firm Size and the Information Content of Bank Loan Announcements, 16 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1057, 1070 (1992).
11
The other standard explanation is that banks resolve information asymmetry for capital
markets when they decide to lend to a firm. Bank lenders may obtain private information
about the firm during the process of negotiating the lending arrangement. Their
consummation of an agreement conveys positive private information to the market about the
firm’s value. Neither explanation – monitoring or information asymmetry – excludes the
other. Both may be at work. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the supporting finance
literature).
12
For the seminal work in this regard, see Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 312-30 (1976).
13
Jensen and Meckling model the agency costs of debt as increasing in the percentage of
outside financing comprised of debt versus equity. See id. at 344-45.
14
As for operational constraints, negative covenants may prohibit many types of
transactions without the bank’s consent. Financial covenants may require the borrower firm
to maintain a healthy financial condition. See infra Part II.A.1.
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requirements, banks enjoy institutional features that facilitate monitoring. For
example, a bank lender often requires its borrower to maintain its deposit
accounts with the bank, an arrangement that enables the bank to monitor its
borrower’s cash flow. Bank lending practices – such as short terms and
specialization by industry – also facilitate monitoring.
Our paper marries two strands of literature – the empirical corporate
governance literature and the corporate finance literature – to investigate the
effect of bank monitoring on firm value. We find evidence consistent with our
bank monitoring theory, 15 especially where agency costs are high. Controlling
for governance indices and for potential simultaneity, we consistently find a
positive and significant relation between firm value and the presence of a bank
loan. This suggests that bank monitoring can help counteract the valuedecreasing effect of managerial entrenchment. In addition, using measures of
free cash flow to differentiate companies with high agency costs, we find that
bank monitoring interacts with free cash flow to enhance firm value, and that
this effect is greater for firms with substantial free cash flow. Finally, we test
interactions among bank loans, free cash flow, and measures of governance
quality. Our results suggest that (a) for a given quality of corporate
governance, free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring improves firm
value; and (b) bank monitoring may matter most when strong entrenchment
would otherwise encourage managers to squander free cash – i.e., when agency
costs are high.
The significant potential for bank governance may implicate a number of
bank- and credit-market-related regulatory design issues, as well as the design
of future empirical corporate governance research. By improving firm value,
bank monitoring may offer a beneficial spillover not previously accounted for
in the crafting of regulation affecting bank lending, creditor rights, or the
operation of loan and credit derivatives markets. To the extent legal rules may
facilitate or impede bank lending or monitoring, they may also indirectly and
inadvertently affect firm value. Given the pervasiveness of bank debt among
public companies, this effect is likely to be nontrivial. Accordingly, we
identify a number of regulatory areas that may deserve new attention.
Similarly, future empirical corporate governance research should both account
for the effects of bank governance and further investigate its potential for
improving firm value.
Part I of this Article reviews the relevant corporate and finance literature.
First, it sketches the empirical corporate governance literature, describing
scholars’ attempts to identify what counts as good traditional corporate
governance and to measure its value. Part I then turns to the literature
suggesting the possibilities for bank governance. Part II develops our
15

Following existing empirical studies on the value of corporate governance, see infra
Part I.A, we use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as our measure of firm value. Tobin’s Q is
defined as the firm’s market value divided by the replacement cost of its assets. See infra
Part III.A.3 for our formula for calculating Tobin’s Q.
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hypotheses. Part III outlines our methodology for measuring the effects of
bank governance. It then discusses our findings. Part IV discusses the
implications of our findings for future research.
I.

BACKGROUND

For decades, corporate scholars have argued over optimal corporate
governance provisions for public companies.16 There is now widespread
consensus that corporate law matters. 17 Empirical studies confirm that
corporate governance arrangements affect shareholder value.18
With just a handful of exceptions discussed below, corporate law scholars
have focused almost exclusively on corporate law and markets for mechanisms
to reduce agency costs in public companies. 19 Law scholars have not much
16

For over thirty years, corporate scholars have debated whether corporate charter
competition benefits investors or only self-serving firm managers. Classic race-to-the-top
works include FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 214 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The
Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” vs. Federal Regulation, 53 J.
BUS. L. 259, 281 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections
on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 914
(1982); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289 (1977). Race-tothe-bottom scholarship includes Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:
The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435,
1509 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1524 (1989); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law,
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 852 (1995) (suggesting network effects
may impede the race to the top); cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an
Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-509 (1987)
(describing the role of the Delaware corporate bar in influencing Delaware corporate law).
17
But see Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (arguing that corporate law rules that appear to
be mandatory are trivial, either because they mimic the parties’ desires anyway, they can
easily be planned around, they are unimportant, or political pressures will cause their
modification in the long run).
18
See infra Part I.A.
19
Besides bank credit agreements, scholars have also identified bond indentures and
directors’ and officers’ insurance policies as promising or potential sources of contractbased agency cost constraints. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial
Contracting, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 125-31 (1979) (explaining the role of bond covenants in
incentivizing shareholders to pursue a firm-value-maximizing investment policy); Tom
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 543 (2007)
(surveying D&O insurance underwriters who overwhelmingly view corporate governance
arrangements as important for assessing liability risk, and hypothesizing that higher
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discussed the possibility that creditor monitoring might improve public
company firm value. 20 By contrast, a well-developed finance literature
explains banks’ special monitoring abilities and suggests that equity holders
may also benefit. 21 To date, however, no one has attempted to measure the
effects of bank monitoring on the traditional indicia of firm value that have
been the focus of empirical corporate governance research.
This Part briefly reviews the literature relevant to our investigation. Section
A describes the empirical corporate governance literature, which forms the
backdrop for our empirical analysis. We take as given the major findings of
this literature that corporate governance adds value. We rely on several
accepted corporate governance measures in our models, either as controls or
interaction variables. Section B discusses the extant legal and finance
literature suggesting that bank monitoring may have value for shareholders.
As described below, the empirical corporate governance literature and the bank
cross-monitoring research have developed largely in isolation from one
another.
A.

Corporate Governance Through Corporate Law: The Empirical
Corporate Governance Literature

Legal and finance scholars have attempted to measure the value of corporate
law and various corporate governance features, generally relying on stock
market-based metrics. Focusing on the race-to-the-top debate,22 Robert Daines
and Guhan Subramanian have each attempted to measure the effect of
Delaware corporate law on firm value. 23 Others have investigated the effects
of specific corporate governance arrangements on stock prices and firm
performance.24
insurance premiums for higher risk firms may serve to deter managerial misbehavior). But
see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1841-42 (2007) (finding that
D&O insurers do not offer loss prevention services or otherwise monitor corporate
governance).
20
Law scholars have, however, extensively analyzed the role of banks in the governance
of small firms. See Scott, supra note 6, at 903-04.
21
See infra Part I.B.2.
22
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
23
Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 556
(2001) (finding evidence consistent with the theory that Delaware corporate law improves
firm value); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
32, 57 (2004) (finding that the “Delaware effect” is limited to small firms during the period
1991-1996 but not afterward, and not for larger firms). Both use Tobin’s Q as their metric
for firm value. See Daines, supra, at 525; Subramanian, supra, at 36.
24
See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the
Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 101, 121 (1985) (finding that board independence is positively correlated with firm
performance); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J.
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Then Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick (GIM) devised their Gindex,25 attempting a comprehensive measure of governance quality. 26 The Gindex tracks governance provisions on shareholder voting, director-officer
protections, managers’ latitude to delay hostile bidders, and other takeover
defenses, among other things. GIM find a significant inverse correlation
between management entrenchment and firm value and performance, using
Tobin’s Q, stock returns, and operating performance as their dependent
variables.27 Other corporate governance studies relying on the G-index
followed.28 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allan Ferrell (BCF) refine the
GIM approach. Instead of canvassing the entire range of corporate governance
items, BCF focus on a subset of the G-index. They identify six provisions they
claim to be the most significant in terms of management entrenchment. 29
These six provisions – staggered boards, limits to bylaw amendments, limits to
charter amendments, supermajority voting for mergers, golden parachutes, and
poison pills – form their E-index.30 Like GIM, BCF find a significant inverse
correlation between their E-index and performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q
FIN. ECON. 409, 432 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Cohen, Entrenched Boards]
(concluding that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value); John E. Core,
Robert W. Holthausen & David Larcker, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer
Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 403 (1999); Richard Lambert
& David Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth,
7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 201 (1985) (suggesting that Golden Parachute adoption is
associated with a positive and statistically significant market reaction); Michael Ryngaert,
The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 377, 411
(1988) (finding that poison pill plans do not benefit shareholders).
25
Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 144.
26
The G-index rates companies based on their degree of management entrenchment as
indicated by twenty-four separate corporate governance features tracked by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Id. at 111. A firm’s G-index score simply reflects
the number of IRRC governance features each firm has in place that increase managerial
control and correspondingly reduce shareholder rights. Id. at 114.
IRRC, formerly an
independent proxy advisory service used primarily by institutional investors, is now a part
of RiskMetrics Group.
27
GIM use profit margin, return on equity, and sales growth as their measures of
operating performance. Id. at 129. GIM’s findings on stock returns have been challenged.
See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause
Weak Stock Returns?: An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investor
Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 685 (2006).
28
See, e.g., K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity
Prices, 60 J. FIN. 2859, 2864 (2005); Klock et al., supra note 9, at 694.
29
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance? 19 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center, Working Paper No. 491,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., What
Matters].
30
Each firm’s E-index for a given year is simply the number of E-index entrenchment
mechanisms the firm has in place in that year. Id. at 2.

1000

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:991

and stock returns.31 Other studies have followed, proposing new governance
indices.32 Though varied in their specific governance focus, the studies
confirm that good governance improves firm value.
31

Id. at 39-40. Subsequent studies by Bhagat & Bolton and Core, Guay & Rusticus
found no correlation between governance measures and stock returns, contrary to GIM and
BCF. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 30
(June 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017342; Core
et. al, supra note 27, at 685. These studies did, however, confirm the correlation between
good governance and operating performance. Bhagat & Bolton, supra, at 6 (finding that
good governance – as measured by the G-index, the E-index, stock ownership of board
members, and the separation of CEO and chairman of the board – is significantly and
positively correlated with operating performance but not stock performance); Core et al.,
supra note 27, at 684-86 (finding that in the 1990s, weak shareholder rights were associated
with poor operating performance but not poor stock returns). In addition, Bhagat and
Bolton find a negative correlation between board independence and operating performance.
Bhagat & Bolton, supra, at 30.
32
For example, scholars have recently constructed indices based on governance
attributes tracked by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) testing both broad-based
indices and sub-indices that more carefully identify which governance features matter. See
Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J.
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 411 (2006); Reena Aggarwal and Rohan Williamson, Did New
Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 3 (Feb. 12, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264.
Brown and Caylor develop their Gov-Score index based on fifty-one ISS governance
attributes. Brown & Caylor, supra, at 411. After showing a positive association between
Gov-Score and firm value, they whittle the index down to seven “key drivers” of their
result, which they aggregate in their Gov-7 index. Id. The seven key factors are: (1) board
members are elected annually; (2) company either has no poison pill or a pill that was
shareholder approved; (3) option re-pricing did not occur within the last three years; (4)
average options granted in the past three years as a percent of basic shares outstanding did
not exceed three percent; (5) all directors attend at least seventy-five percent of board
meetings or had a valid excuse for non-attendance; (6) board guidelines are in each proxy
statement; and (7) directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines. Id.
Aggarwal and Williamson offer another set of ISS-based governance measures. Their
Gov64 index aggregates all sixty-four governance attributes tracked by ISS, scoring each
firm by the number of ISS governance features the firm has in place. Aggarwal &
Williamson, supra, at 1. Using Gov64 as their measure of governance, they find a positive
association between good governance and firm value, which is both statistically and
economically significant. Id. at 18. They also sort their sixty-four governance features into
eight categories – Board (relating to board structure and function), Audit (the audit
committee and the role of auditors), State (state law anti-takeover provisions), Charter
(charter-based anti-takeover devices), Compensation (executive and director compensation),
Progressive (progressive practices on board appointments and board review, among other
things), Ownership (ownership by directors), and Education (director education). Id. at 8.
Testing each governance category separately, they find that all categories except State and
Education have a positive and significant association with firm value. Id. at 18-19.
In addition to these U.S. indices, Bernie Black, Hasung Jang, and Woochan Kim create a
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At the same time, empirical corporate governance scholars have
acknowledged the difficulty of identifying causal mechanisms in corporate
governance. Corporate governance features are likely to be simultaneously
determined with other firm characteristics – capital structure, ownership
structure, and corporate performance, for example. 33 Simultaneity therefore
poses a serious concern and an important qualifier for drawing any conclusions
from empirical analysis.34 We do not attempt to resolve these potential biases
in the existing empirical corporate governance literature. Instead, we take
these approaches as given. We rely on several existing measures of corporate
governance – GIM’s G-index, BCF’s E-index, and individual components of
the E-index – as alternative controls and interaction terms in our models below.
B.

The Possibility of Bank Governance

Implicit in the empirical corporate governance scholarship is the assumption
that legal rules and contracts structuring relations among firm managers and
shareholders supply the primary governance mechanisms affecting managerial
agency costs and firm performance. The corporate finance literature, on the
other hand, has focused primarily on financial intermediation and the benefits
of cross-monitoring among investors, and has developed largely independently
from the corporate governance literature. 35 Relying in part on this crossmonitoring literature, legal scholars have developed theories of bank
governance, suggesting that banks may play an important governance role as
the firm approaches distress. These new theories focus primarily on the
distress context and banks’ influence once the firm has defaulted on its debt
obligation. By contrast, we contend that bank monitoring has broader
influence, affecting firm performance generally. We first introduce the
handful of studies suggesting the possibility of bank governance. We then
briefly survey the finance literature on bank monitoring.

corporate governance index for Korean companies, again showing a strong association
between corporate governance and firm value. Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, & Woochan
Kim, Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values?: Evidence from Korea,
22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 368 (2006).
33
See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 31, at 9.
34
Simultaneity is more fully discussed in Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 31, at 23. Bhagat
and Bolton highlight the endogeneity issues affecting earlier studies. Unlike these earlier
studies, they rely on a system of four simultaneous equations to address endogeneity. See
id. at 11. Bhagat and Bolton propose a new governance measure – the dollar value of stock
ownership of the median director – as an alternative to the unweighted G- and E-indexes.
Id.
35
One exception is Klock, et al., supra note 9, at 693 (considering the relationship
between debt financing and corporate governance).
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Bank Governance

George Triantis and Ron Daniels were among the first to suggest that bank
monitoring might benefit a firm’s claimants generally and a firm’s
shareholders in particular.36 In their seminal 1995 article, they proposed an
interactive theory of corporate governance, arguing that stakeholders’ exit
decisions provide valuable information to one another, thereby enhancing their
collective ability to discipline management. 37 The bank is the central monitor
under this theory: its specialized monitoring abilities make it the low-cost
monitor.38 Because the borrower and creditors as a group care about
minimizing total monitoring costs, the borrower willingly grants covenant
protections to the bank that it may not grant other creditors. The bank’s
contract rights and ongoing monitoring enable it both to deter managerial slack
and to detect it early. Upon detection, the bank may either exit or intervene,
even to the point of having management replaced.39 In either case, the bank’s
action signals other stakeholders, who may also act to protect their interests.
While classic finance theory focuses on the conflicts between debt holders and
equity holders,40 especially as the firm nears distress, the bank lender may have
good reason to work toward the firm’s recovery as a going concern. The
prospect of repeat business with the firm may serve to align the bank’s
interests with those of equity holders as to investment policy and the firm’s
recovery.41
Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen have recently renewed the focus on
creditor monitoring and corporate governance, describing creditor control as
the “missing lever” in the corporate governance literature. 42 They highlight the
underappreciated role that banks and bank loan covenants play in corporate
governance when a firm defaults. The detailed reporting obligations and
contract constraints imposed by the loan agreement, as well as the bank’s
ability to control the borrower’s cash, enable the bank literally to control the
firm.43 Once the firm defaults, the bank’s ability to discipline management is
much greater than with traditional governance mechanisms. 44 Banks routinely
36

Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1074.
Id. at 1080.
38
Id. at 1083 (emphasizing that the bank enjoys better information than other creditors,
and its business model generates monitoring economies not available to other creditors).
39
Id. at 1084.
40
See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 305.
41
Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1100-01.
42
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211.
43
See id. at 1227-29 (illustrating the degree to which banks can exert control over a firm
by managing its cash flow).
44
Compare, for example, bank monitoring with monitoring by shareholders – the firm’s
traditional “owners.” Banks enjoy far better information about the firm, and exercise far
more oversight and control over the firm’s affairs, than do shareholders. See id. at 1217.
The corporate charter is a short document; the loan agreement can easily exceed one
37
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demand management changes when a borrower firm defaults, 45 something
shareholders simply cannot do. Similarly, the market for corporate control has
only a weak disciplining effect on management compared to bank discipline.
Firms may erect takeover defenses to deter hostile takeovers, but once they
take on private debt, they have little defense against creditor control.46
Like Triantis and Daniels, Baird and Rasmussen resist the finance canon on
the agency costs of debt, which focuses on the conflicts among different
investor classes that preclude efficient investment when the firm is in
distress.47 Baird and Rasmussen describe the incentives of the senior lender –
typically the bank – to pursue even risky projects to maximize firm value. 48 If
a sale is in the offing, as is common, the senior lender will not oppose efficient
but risky investments, since it will be interested in increasing the firm’s value
and sale price.49 Even with no possibility of a sale, the senior lender may
endorse risky investments. The senior lender’s claim is often converted to
equity in a Chapter Eleven reorganization, so it has the same incentives as the
classic residual owner.50

hundred pages. See id.
45
Id. at 1233-34; Sadi Ozelge, The Role of Banks and Private Lenders in Forced CEO
Turnovers 1 (Jan. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1031814 (finding that for an underperforming firm, an average level of bank debt
implies a twenty-five to forty-six percent increase in the probability of forced CEO turnover,
and if the underperforming firm violates a loan covenant, the increased probability of forced
CEO turnover jumps to sixty-seven to ninety-percent).
46
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1244. Simply paying off the loan is typically not
a ready option:
In theory, a business can rid itself of a creditor who presses too hard by repaying the
loan, but a business that encounters difficulty with a private creditor is likely to have
trouble replacing it with another. Any new lender has to worry about the private
information held by the existing lender. The existing lender may want to withdraw for
reasons that are not yet plain to outsiders. Any new lender is in any event bound to
insist upon its own control rights to protect itself.
Id.
47
See id. at 1212-13. For the finance canon on agency costs of debt, see generally
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12.
48
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1246. Under the traditional finance canon,
the senior lender of the distressed firm will typically resist risky projects, and even efficient
ones, because it will bear a disproportionate share of any losses without enjoying a
commensurate share of the gains. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 334.
49
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1246.
50
See id. at 1246-47. As other evidence of coincident interests across different investor
classes, Baird & Rasmussen note the recent popularity of “silent” second lien loans, where a
junior lender takes a second lien in the senior lender’s collateral, but agrees to follow the
senior’s lead on major issues in the bankruptcy case, including DIP financing, asset sales,
and voting on the plan of reorganization. These arrangements evidence sophisticated
investors’ recognition of shared interests across investor classes. See id.
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Aside from these thoughtful discussions, creditor governance has largely
been ignored in the legal and finance literature. As earlier noted, this nascent
literature took early cues from corporate finance scholars, who beginning in
the 1980s pioneered the research indirectly suggesting the possibility of bank
governance. The next Section briefly reviews this finance literature.
2.

The Supporting Finance Literature

The theoretical case for banks’ special monitoring ability has been modeled
extensively.51 Empirical testing of this proposition has generally taken the
form of event studies showing positive abnormal stock returns triggered by
firms’ bank loan announcements. 52 These studies confirm that banks’
extensions of credit generally benefit stockholders of the borrower firm. 53
Two theoretical accounts have been offered to explain this effect. The
positive stock price reaction may reflect the value of future bank monitoring
over the life of the loan. Alternatively, the bank’s initial lending decision may
itself create a positive market reaction by resolving information asymmetry for
the market. The bank’s decision to lend in effect acts as a signal for good
firms. The bank obtains private information about the firm during its pre-loan
diligence process. Its lending decision may therefore convey positive private
information concerning the firm’s creditworthiness or the value of its
projects.54 These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and studies tend to
suggest that both information asymmetry and monitoring theories may help

51

See Tim S. Campbell & William A. Kracaw, Information Production, Market
Signaling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation, 35 J. FIN. 863 (1980); Douglas W.
Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393
(1984); Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29 (1985);
Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, Information Reliability and a Theory of
Financial Intermediation, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 415 (1984).
52
See supra note 10.
53
See Billet et al., supra note 10, at 700. Several studies suggest that non-bank private
debt may also bring bank-like benefits to equity holders. These studies show a positive
stock price reaction to announcements of non-bank private debt placements, with no
statistical difference between announcements of bank debt versus non-bank private debt.
See Billet, et al., supra note 10, at 700 (finding no significant difference between abnormal
returns for bank versus nonbank loans); Dianna C. Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux,
Monitoring by Financial Intermediaries: Banks versus Nonbanks, 8 J. FIN. SERVICES RES.
193, 200-01 (1994) (finding that borrowing firms experience positive abnormal returns upon
announcing conclusions of loan agreements with nonbank lenders). Our data identify only
bank debt, however. Other forms of private debt – loans made by non-bank entities like
insurance companies and commercial finance companies, for example – are not included.
54
See James, supra note 10, at 225-27 (finding a positive stock price response to the
announcement of new bank credit agreements); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch,
Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 58-59
(1986).
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explain the market’s positive reaction. Because our focus is on monitoring, we
discuss empirical support for the monitoring theory below.55
An early study of positive stock price reactions to bank loan announcements
distinguishes bank loans by stated purpose. 56 Comparing loans for debt
refinance with capital expenditure loans, the study finds no significant
difference in stock price response. 57 Abnormal stock returns from new loan
announcements therefore cannot be explained solely by an information
asymmetry theory,58 since debt refinance loans convey no private information
about the firm’s growth prospects. Though the study’s author draws no
definitive conclusion as to other causal theories, 59 bank monitoring offers a
plausible explanation.60
Another study distinguishes between new bank loans and loan renewals. 61 It
finds excess stock returns almost exclusively around the announcement of loan
renewals, but not new loans.62 The authors conclude that the value to
shareholders comes not from the initial screening of prospective borrowers, but
from private information the bank gleans during the course of its relationship

55
As for information asymmetry, several studies support this notion that an extension of
bank credit conveys positive private information about the firm. See Best & Zhang, supra
note 10, at 1520-22. Using financial analysts’ percentage earnings forecast errors as a proxy
for information asymmetry, one study shows that firms with high forecast errors enjoy
significant positive stock price reactions to bank loan announcements, while firms with low
forecast errors do not. Id. at 1517. Along similar lines, another study investigates public
companies’ marginal financing decisions, confirming the positive abnormal stock returns
that accompany bank loan announcements, which are both statistically significant and also
significantly different from the negative abnormal returns accompanying announcements of
public issues of common stock and straight debt. See Charles J. Hadlock & Christopher M.
James, Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?, 57 J. FIN. 1383, 1386 (2002). This study also
finds that firms choosing bank debt have higher stock return volatility and higher analyst
forecast errors than firms issuing public securities, which is consistent with the notion that
information asymmetry and adverse selection costs drive firms to choose bank debt. Id. at
1385.
56
James, supra note 10, at 228.
57
Id. James finds the same result when capital expenditure loans are combined with
general purpose corporate loans. Id. at 228-29.
58
Id. at 229.
59
The author leaves this question for future research. Id. at 234.
60
As interesting, the study finds a statistically significant negative stock price reaction
for announcements of private and straight public debt offerings used to refinance bank
loans. Id. One plausible explanation for the market’s negative reaction – consistent with
our monitoring story – is that these transactions harm shareholders by eliminating the bank
monitor.
61
Scott L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending
Process and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99,
99 (1989).
62
Id. at 120.
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with the borrower. 63 This result is consistent with a monitoring theory. Banks
provide a credible signal of firm value only as a result of continuing
information gathering with respect to a borrower firm. 64
In addition to these event studies, another study investigates the monitoring
benefits of private debt, including bank debt. 65 Examining various potential
determinants of a firm’s mix of public and private debt, the study finds that
firms with greater growth prospects – and therefore greater debt-related moral
hazard problems66 – rely more heavily on private debt than on public debt.
The authors attribute this result to the monitoring advantages of private debt. 67
The stricter monitoring and more restrictive covenants that accompany private
debt help mitigate the costs associated with shareholder-creditor conflict.68
These studies are consistent with our monitoring hypothesis.69 We develop
our hypothesis in Part II.
63

Id. at 113.
Id. One drawback here is that subsequent research has not supported Lummer and
McConnell’s claimed distinction between new loans and renewals. Controlling for
differences in other borrower and lender characteristics, such as precision of analyst
earnings forecasts and lender credit quality, subsequent studies find no statistically
significant difference in stock price reaction to announcements of new loans versus
renewals. See Best & Zhang, supra note 10, at 1512-13; Billett et al., supra note 10, at 716.
65
Sudha Krishnaswami, Paul A. Spindt & Venkat Subramaniam, Information
Asymmetry, Monitoring, and the Placement Structure of Corporate Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON.
407, 414 (1999) (defining private debt as including bank loans, finance company loans, and
loans from other financial institutions).
66
Greater growth prospects beget higher moral hazard because of the greater potential
for asset substitution and underinvestment. Id. at 411 (commenting that “contracting costs
due to underinvestment and asset substitution are higher for firms with more growth options
because [of] the conflict between shareholders and bondholders”).
67
Id. at 432.
68
Id. The study also confirms that firms with greater potential information asymmetries
rely more on private debt than other firms. Id. at 428.
69
Other studies confirm the value of bank monitoring to claimants other than
shareholders. One study finds evidence of the value of bank monitoring to bondholders’
benefit. See Datta, et al., supra note 9, at 448. In this study, the presence of a pre-existing
bank loan reduced at-issue yield spreads for borrower firms’ first public debt offerings by an
average of sixty-eight basis points, which was both statistically and economically
significant. Id. at 437. As the authors note, this likely reflects the value of bank monitoring,
which reduces moral hazard in a way that bondholders alone cannot. Id. at 436. It would be
difficult to explain the reduced at-issue yield spreads in terms of bank screening and reduced
information asymmetry: at the time of the bond issue, the already-existing bank loan offers
no new information to the market. Moreover, the length of the bank/firm relationship is also
statistically significant and negatively related to at-issue yield spreads, which is again
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. See id. at 437. Though the authors offer a
reputation story to explain this result, id. at 449, a lengthy bank/firm relationship may also
signal the bank’s familiarity with the borrower’s business, thereby improving the bank’s
ability to monitor.
64
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Despite the burgeoning empirical corporate governance literature, to date no
one has attempted to measure the effects of bank monitoring on firm value. No
study has attempted to investigate the interaction of bank monitoring with
corporate governance. We hypothesize that bank monitoring may enhance
firm value. Over a wide range of situations, the interests of lenders and equity
holders may converge in reducing managerial agency costs. Because creditors
and equity holders share a common interest in agency cost reduction, we
hypothesize that bank monitoring enhances firm value. In this Part, we first
explain our affirmative hypotheses. We then discuss some potential theoretical
limitations.
A.

Our Hypotheses
1.

Bank Monitoring: The Mechanics

How does bank monitoring operate to control agency costs? The standard
credit agreement imposes numerous specific restrictions and obligations on the
borrower firm regarding operational matters and financial condition. 70 In
addition, the bank also demands a regular flow of information from the
borrower concerning its financial and operating performance. As detailed
below, the bank typically imposes numerous periodic and special reporting
requirements on the borrower.
As far as operational constraints, negative covenants prohibit the firm from
engaging in certain transactions without the bank’s consent. For example, the
firm’s latitude to incur new debt, make investments or distributions, engage in
transactions with affiliates, sell substantial assets, give liens on its assets,
merge, or change the nature of its business, may all be explicitly restricted in
the loan agreement. Use of loan proceeds is restricted. In addition to
operational restrictions, financial covenants generally require the firm to
maintain a healthy financial condition. It must, for example, preserve certain
levels of net worth, tangible assets, total capital relative to debt, or cash flow
relative to debt service obligations. 71 Myriad technical default provisions in
the contract enable the bank to tighten the reins if the firm falters.
Another study examines loan and bond defaults, comparing trading price reactions around
the default date and finding a smaller price reaction for loans than bonds, which suggests
that more precise information is embedded in loan prices because of banks’ superior
ongoing monitoring. Edward Altman, Amar Gande & Anthony Saunders, Bank Debt
Versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices 30 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=639081.
70
See, e.g., Staples Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 20, 2004) (describing
2004 Revolving Credit Agreement with Bank of America); Stride Rite Corp., Current
Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Sept. 22, 2005) (describing revolving credit agreement with Bank
of America).
71
Bond indentures contain similar provisions. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. U.S.
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In addition to operational constraints and financial covenants, the bank
keeps tabs on the borrower by requiring it to produce a steady stream of
information to the bank in the form of periodic financial and operating reports.
This information is far more timely and detailed than any regular public
disclosure the borrower firm may be required to make. The bank also typically
enjoys direct access to firm management to address any concerns it might
have. Banks therefore enjoy far better information about a firm than individual
or even institutional investors. With its periodic reports, the firm must also
certify its continuing compliance with each specific condition and restriction
contained in the credit agreement. For example, in addition to producing
quarterly financial statements, the firm may be required specifically to certify
its net worth, tangible assets, cash flow, or other accounting benchmarks in
order to confirm its compliance with individual financial covenants. Besides
these regular reports, the borrower obligates itself to provide notice to the bank
of the occurrence of any of a number of unfortunate incidents that might
adversely affect the borrower’s creditworthiness – material litigation, a default
or potential default on the loan, or receipt of a government notice of a material
regulatory violation, for example.
In addition to contractual constraints and ongoing reporting, the bank often
has a representative on the borrower’s board of directors, 72 which offers one
more avenue for active monitoring. Banks also enjoy institutional features that
facilitate monitoring. They typically offer cash management services to their
borrowers, who are often required to maintain their deposit accounts with their
bank lender. This arrangement enables a bank to closely follow its borrower’s
aggregation and use of cash in real time, giving the bank a clear window on the
borrower’s business activity. Bank lending practices also facilitate monitoring.
Bank lending is ordinarily only short-term or medium-term,73 which means
borrowers must periodically renew their bank lending arrangements. This
gives the bank fresh opportunities to re-examine its borrowers’
creditworthiness, and also gives borrower managers incentive to maintain
creditworthiness. Banks often also specialize in lending to particular industries
or industry segments. Industry expertise facilitates monitoring and enables
bankers to more precisely evaluate the ongoing credit risk of individual
borrower firms.

Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 943 (Del. Ch. 2004). The court’s
detailed technical discussion of note indenture provisions in that case illustrates the
thoroughness and complexity of creditor protections in standard credit arrangements. See
id. at 943-47.
72
See Randall S. Krozner & Philip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts
of Interest, and Lender Liability, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 415, 416 (2001) (explaining that one-third
of large U.S. firms have a banker on the board of directors).
73
Banks’ predominant liabilities are short-term deposits, so to match the timing of their
assets and liabilities, banks tend to avoid long-term loans.
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The Pervasive Effects of Bank Monitoring

Contrary to the existing bank governance literature, we believe banks’
elaborate monitoring arrangements affect managerial behavior and firm value
even outside the narrow distress context. 74 Financial covenants in public
company credit agreements are pervasive, 75 and managers have strong
incentive to avoid breaching their covenant obligations, lest their managerial
discretion be curtailed by bank intervention. 76 In addition to this threat, credit
agreements quite often contain positive performance incentives for managers,
such as variable pricing based on specified performance measures. 77 The
borrower’s interest rate may rise or fall, for example, based on the firm’s ratio
of debt-to-cash flow.78 Moreover, covenant violations are not uncommon. 79
Violations do trigger bank intervention, but they rarely lead to default or loan
acceleration.80 Given this environment, it makes sense that banks’ influence
on firm governance may be steady rather than episodic, felt even outside the
distress context.
3.

Free Cash Flow

Free cash flow has been identified as an especially pernicious temptation for
managers, who may “use it to bankroll forms of managerial slack.” 81 Free cash
74

See Frederick Tung, Private Debt and Corporate Governance 44-45 (Sept. 14, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the recent empirical finance
literature demonstrating the governance effects of private debt).
75
See Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An
Empirical Investigation 7 (Aug. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=962131 (finding that ninety-seven percent of public company credit
agreements in the 1996-2005 sample period had at least one financial covenant).
76
See id. at 14 (commenting upon managers’ singular desire to maintain control of their
companies).
77
See Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Contingency and Renegotiation of Financial
Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements 8 (July 31, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017629 (finding that over seventy-two
percent of private credit agreements specify performance pricing).
78
Id.
79
See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 75, at 42 tbl.2 (indicating that more than one quarter of
public companies in the 1996-2005 sample period violated a financial covenant, with the
fraction increasing to nearly one-third for firms with an average leverage ratio of at least
five percent).
80
V. Gopalakrishnan & Mohinder Parkash, Borrower and Lender Perceptions of
Accounting Information in Corporate Lending Agreements, in 9 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 13,
25 (1995).
81
Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1078; see also Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986).
We use a standard measure of free cash flow: operating income minus interest expense,
taxes, preferred and common dividends, scaled by the book value of the firm’s assets. See
infra Part III.D.2.
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flow may increase the agency conflict between managers and shareholders
because managers may be tempted to spend free cash for their own benefit –
on perks or empire building, for example – rather than distribute it to
shareholders.82 Managers may overinvest – invest inefficiently83 – in building
empires in order to increase their compensation and power. An increase in
firm size places more resources under managers’ control, thereby enhancing
their power and prestige. 84 Similarly, increased firm size typically results in
sales growth, which is positively correlated with increases in manager
compensation.85
We expect that, ceteris paribas, firms with high free cash flow will benefit
most from bank monitoring because of their higher potential for agency
conflicts. Bank loan arrangements address this free cash flow problem in
several ways. First, mandatory regular interest and principal payments on the
loan reduce the amount of free cash. 86 Second, bank loans often contain a
“sweep” covenant, which requires the borrower to pay down some portion of
its loan once it has engaged in an asset sale or financing transaction that
generates a large accumulation of cash, 87 or even if it has simply accumulated
“excess” cash.88 Third, as described above, the lender typically requires the
borrower firm to maintain its deposit accounts with the lender. This enables
the lender to monitor the firm’s cash levels and uses of cash. 89 Finally, the
bank may take security interests in the firm’s assets, which further constrains
managers’ access to free cash. Because the security arrangement ordinarily
prohibits sale or further hypothecation of the underlying collateral, managers’
disposal of those assets to generate cash is not an option. 90
Overall, the web of reporting requirements, covenant obligations and other
restrictions, along with explicit bank oversight, serve to constrain
overinvestment and otherwise control managerial slack. This disciplining

82

See Jensen, supra note 81, at 323.
Managers overinvest when, finding themselves with cash available after having
pursued all available efficient investment opportunities, they continue to invest – in negative
net present value projects – because they can. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 627-28 (1989).
84
Id. at 627.
85
Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An
Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11, 40 (1985).
86
See Jensen, supra note 81, at 324.
87
See Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate
Debt Covenants 11 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=466240.
88
This latter constraint is typically expressed as a requirement that some percentage of
the borrower’s free cash above a specified threshold be applied to reduce the loan balance.
89
See supra Part II.A.1.
90
See George G. Triantis, A Free Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor
Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2159-61 (1994).
83
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effect of bank debt benefits shareholders as well as the bank. We do not
suggest that lender and shareholder interests always coincide. 91 Shareholders
of course suffer the first pain from managerial slack, since they hold the
residual claim on the firm. At the margin, therefore, the bank may worry less
than the firm’s equity holders about managers’ misuse of free cash. 92
However, because inefficient investment reduces firm value, it harms lenders
as well as equity investors. The popularity of capital expenditure covenants
and excess cash flow covenants attests to this lender concern. 93
4.

Management Entrenchment

With regard to management entrenchment, as with free cash flow, we expect
bank monitoring to be most beneficial when agency costs are high – i.e., when
managers are more entrenched. Entrenchment insulates managers from
discipline by shareholders and by the market for corporate control, thereby
encouraging slack. We use GIM’s G-index, BCF’s E-index, and individual
components of the E-index as controls and interaction variables to test the
effects of bank monitoring in the presence of entrenchment.
B.

Potential Theoretical Limitations
1. Moral Hazard or Adverse Selection?: Monitoring Versus Information
Asymmetry

Because we use a market-based metric for firm value as our dependent
variable – industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q – a preliminary issue arises in trying to
interpret observed increases in Tobin’s Q associated with the presence of bank
loans. As noted earlier, both the theoretical and empirical finance literature
identify two main explanations for the positive stock market reaction to bank
loan announcements.94
First, bank loan announcements may resolve
information asymmetries affecting stock markets. A bank loan signals the
market that the borrower is creditworthy or has good projects. Second,
positive stock market reactions may also reflect the value to the firm of bank
monitoring. While banks monitor to reduce moral hazard, the firm’s
91
Jensen and Meckling’s classic work explains managers’ incentives and means to
transfer wealth opportunistically from creditors to shareholders. See generally Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 12.
92
Moreover, the bank may object more strenuously to asset substitution, even through
positive net present value projects, than overinvestment through low-risk projects.
93
See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, The Information Content of Bank Loan
Covenants 9 (Aug. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 959393; Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control
Rights and Firm Investment Policy 2 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 928688 (finding that forty percent of firms faced a capital
expenditure restriction during a 1996-2005 sample period).
94
See supra Part I.B.2.
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shareholders may also benefit from the bank’s ability to deter self-interested
overinvestment by the firm’s managers.
Earlier, we reviewed in some detail the extant literature on the value of bank
monitoring, noting the importance of bank monitoring to curb moral hazard, as
well as the possible selection effects at work. 95 We are mindful of these
competing explanations in designing our study. Because an increase in
Tobin’s Q associated with a bank loan is consistent with either explanation, we
look at subsamples of firm-years in an attempt to isolate the monitoring
effect.96 We also examine subsamples of loans based on their stated purposes,
hypothesizing that certain types of loans carry little or no benefit to equity
markets in terms of resolving information asymmetry.
2.

Risk Reduction and Banks’ Reduced Incentives to Monitor

Banks and other financial claimants have increasingly more and finer
opportunities to transfer risk to third parties. Loan syndication, active
secondary loan markets, and the ready availability of credit derivatives 97
enable banks and other financial institutions to lay off risk and rebalance their
portfolios in response to changed circumstances. A bank’s reduced exposure
to a particular borrower correspondingly reduces the bank’s incentive to
monitor that borrower carefully. 98
While use of these risk spreading devices has become more and more
common among banks and other private lenders,99 there remain good reasons
to expect that banks – especially lead banks in syndicated loans – will continue
to monitor their borrowers. Lead banks have reputational interests at stake.
Other less informed syndicate members depend on the lead bank for careful
screening and monitoring of borrowers. A lead bank that acts opportunistically
toward its syndicate members – by syndicating poor quality loans, for instance
– could incur reputational penalties with syndicate members, risking future

95

See supra Part I.B.2.
See infra p. 1023 tbl.3.
97
The most popular credit derivative for bank lenders is the credit default swap. It
effectively offers the lender default insurance on specific borrowers. As with conventional
insurance, the insured (here, the lender) pays a premium to the issuer of the swap agreement,
which obligates the issuer to repay the insured debt (or some portion) to the insured should
the borrower default. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Peril of
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021-22 (2007).
98
See id. at 1032-34.
99
See, e.g., Steven A. Dennis & Donald J. Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 404, 404 (2000) (describing the growing prevalence of syndicated loans);
Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennachi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable
Assets, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 389, 391 (1995) (describing the dramatic rise in loan sales
that occurred in the 1980s); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 97, at 1020 (describing the
increased prevalence of credit derivatives).
96
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business.100 Empirical evidence shows, in fact, that lead banks are faithful
certifiers of credit quality to their bank syndicates. While they could exploit
private information about borrowers by syndicating or selling only loans of
lower ex ante credit quality, existing studies show just the opposite. Loans of
higher ex ante credit quality are more likely to be syndicated in larger
proportions by lead banks. 101 Lead banks’ success in syndicating larger
percentages of their loans is also positively associated with reputational
measures.102
More generally, empirical evidence suggests that bank monitoring continues
to have value in the presence of bank debt trading. Amar Gande and Anthony
Saunders find that bank loan announcements continue to be associated with
positive stock price reactions even when the borrower’s loans trade on the
secondary market.103 This result holds even for distressed firms, for which
reduced incentives for bank monitoring would ex ante be expected to have the
most adverse effects.104 Additionally, the inception of trading in the borrower
firm’s bank debt elicits a positive stock price reaction, suggesting that bank
monitoring and the secondary market offer complementary sources of
information about borrower firms. 105
Even with devices available to reduce risk, banks’ profit making generally
depends on their taking positions in their borrower firms. A bank is not merely
a loan broker. It gets paid to take risk. Though the bank may have new tools
available to enable it to lend at lower risk, it still has incentive to monitor given
its exposure and the importance of its reputational capital. 106 Moreover,
diversification does not eliminate lending risk entirely. Loan purchasers and
sellers of credit derivatives will have some stake in the continuing monitoring

100

See Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Loan Syndicate Structure:
Evidence from Ex Post Risk 25 (Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083707 (suggesting that “the lead bank’s reputation can serve as
an effective mechanism to assuage the incentive conflicts associated with loan
syndications”).
101
See Dennis & Mullineaux, supra note 99, at 424; cf. Panyagometh & Roberts, supra
note 100, at 24 (finding that lead banks syndicate greater proportions of loans to ex post
higher quality borrowers as measured by bond ratings). Similarly, higher quality loans ex
ante are more likely to be sold in secondary markets. Gorton & Pennachi, supra note 99, at
409-410.
102
Dennis & Mullineaux, supra note 99, at 407.
103
See Amar Gande & Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a
Secondary Market for Loans? 3 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=873353.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 22.
106
See Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Financial Distress, and
the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates, 33 FIN. MGMT. 107, 109 (2004)
(discussing reputational benefits for loan sellers and arrangers).
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of borrowers, the efficacy of which will no doubt affect the pricing in these
risk spreading transactions.
III. BANK MONITORING AND FIRM VALUE
To explore the relationship between bank monitoring and firm value, we
estimate a series of multivariate regressions that measure how Tobin’s Q is
related to the presence of bank loans. We describe our methodology before
presenting our results.
A.

Methodology
1.

The Model’s Technical Structure

Our model is:
(1)

TobinsQit =  + 1LOANit + 2GINDEXit +

3FINANCIALit + 4fi + 5yt + it
where:
TobinsQ

Our dependent variable, which is each firm’s industryadjusted Tobin’s Q.

LOAN

This indicates whether a given firm had a bank loan for all
twelve calendar months of year t.

GINDEX

G-index, GIM’s measure of managerial entrenchment.

FINANCIAL

Includes six standard financial controls:
i. Assets of the firm;
ii. Age of the firm in months;
iii. Return on assets;
iv. Capital expenditures on assets;
v. Research and development expenditures; and
vi. Leverage.

f and y

Firm and year dummy variables.
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Our Data

Our universe of companies comes from the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) database,107 which has published volumes detailing firms’
corporate governance provisions since 1990. 108 IRRC’s coverage includes all
firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P), all firms named in annual lists of
the largest corporations by Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week, and additional
firms the IRRC has considered important.109 In any publication year, the
universe of IRRC firms covers over ninety percent of total U.S. stock market
capitalization.110 Following GIM and BCF, we include all IRRC firms in our
database through 2004, except for those with dual-class common stock.
Because IRRC volumes are not published every year, we follow the
convention adopted by GIM in treating firms’ governance provisions as
unchanged for the period from the last published volume to the next published
volume.111
We take firm financial information from Compustat. 112 Company stock data
comes from CRSP monthly files. 113 For loan information, we rely on the
DealScan database from the Loan Pricing Corporation, a comprehensive
commercial loan database covering large- and middle-market commercial
loans.114 DealScan contains detailed terms and conditions for over 155,000
loan and bond transactions dating back to 1988. 115
3.

Details of the Model

Equation (1) measures the relationship between industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
and the presence of a bank loan, while controlling for other factors that also
affect firm value. Our estimation of this equation will disaggregate the
influence of each included factor, allowing us to distinguish the influence of
bank loans from other factors that might also affect firm value. As noted
above, we use Tobin’s Q as our measure of firm value. 116 Tobin’s Q is the
107

IRRC is a proxy advisory service used primarily by institutional investors. Gompers
et al., supra note 2, at 113.
108
Id. at 110.
109
Id. at 111.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 110-19.
112
Compustat is an extensive database of securities information created and maintained
by
Standard
&
Poors.
Standard
&
Poors’
Compustat
Website,
http://www.compustatresources.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
113
CRSP is the Center for Research in Security Prices which is part of the University of
Chicago’s Graduate School of Business. About CRSP, http://www.crsp.com/crsp/about
/history.html (last visited May 24, 2008).
114
See DealScan, http://www.loanpricing.com/products_services/dealscan.htm (last
visited May 5, 2008).
115
Id.
116
See supra Part III.A.1. In our definition of Tobin’s Q, we follow Bebchuk et al.,
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ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market
value of assets is equal to the book value of assets, plus the market value of
common stock, minus the sum of book value of common stock and balance
sheet deferred taxes. The dependent variable in our estimations is industryadjusted Tobin’s Q – each firm’s Q minus the median Q in the firm’s industry
in the observation year. We define each firm’s industry by the firm’s two-digit
primary SIC code.
Our proxy for bank monitoring is a loan indicator variable, which is set to
one for each year that a given firm had a bank loan for all twelve calendar
months. We include standard financial controls that previous research has
identified as related to Tobin’s Q.117 We also include year dummies and firm
dummies in the fixed effects regressions.
In most specifications, we rely on GIM’s G-index as a measure of
managerial entrenchment. As an alternative in some specifications, we include
BCF’s E-index or its components as entrenchment measures. We use these as
either controls or as interaction variables. We also include a measure of free
cash flow in some estimations. As noted earlier, the tendency of managers to
overinvest or misuse discretionary funds presents a serious agency conflict
between managers and shareholders. 118 Michael Jensen asserts that free cash
flow is the best measure of these discretionary funds and thus the best proxy
for agency conflicts. 119 Our measure of free cash flow is calculated as
operating income minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividend, and
common dividends,120 scaled by the book value of the firm’s assets.121
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of variables included in the
estimations. We present the descriptive statistics for our entire sample of
firms. We also divide our sample into two subsamples – firms that have had a
bank loan at some point during our sample period and firms that have not – and
present descriptive statistics for these subsamples as well.

What Matters, supra note 29, at 19, Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 126, and Steven N.
Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures
of Financing Constraints?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 169, 177 (1997).
117
Following GIM, we include the assets of the firm and the age of the firm measured in
months. Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 126. Following BCF, we include return on assets,
capital expenditures on assets, research and development expenditures, and leverage.
Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 29, at 19.
118
See supra Part II.A.3.
119
See Jensen, supra note 81, at 323-24.
120
This cash flow computation is given by Compustat item #13 - #15 - (#16 - change in
#35) - #19 - #21.
121
This definition follows Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulson, Free Cash Flow and
Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771, 777 (1989).
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Entire Sample

Loan Firms Only

Non-Loan Firms Only

# of
Obs.

Mean

Standard
Deviation

# of
Obs.

Mean

Standard
Deviation

# of
Obs.

Mean

Standard
Deviation

22487

0.720

3.316

14470

0.546

2.199

8017

1.033

4.688

28335

0.373

0.484

17472

0.605

0.489

10863

0.000

0.000

17889

9.183

2.752

11923

9.349

2.757

5966

8.850

2.712

E Index
17889 2.153
1.307
Free
Cash
Flow
23337 0.092
0.183
Assets
(millions) 27886 6946.195 35947.88
Firm Age
(months) 28335 230.026 215.337

11923

2.191

1.299

5966

2.079

1.321

15430

0.110

0.148

7907

0.057

0.234

ROA
CAPEX/
Assets

27866

0.014

0.237

17365

0.037

0.134

10501

-0.024

0.341

25553

0.062

0.064

16648

0.061

0.061

8905

0.063

0.069

Leverage
R&D per
Sales
Poison
Pill
Indicator

22860

0.436

0.249

14761

0.446

0.209

8099

0.417

0.308

14328

0.490

7.903

9095

0.101

1.014

5233

1.166

12.981

17889

0.564

0.496

11923

0.586

0.493

5966

0.519

0.500

Variable
IndustryAdjusted
Tobin’s Q
Loan
Indicator
G Index

17375 8214.022 43493.35 10511 4850.438 17158.770
17472 254.798

224.330

10863 190.183 193.494

The dataset includes information on Tobin’s Q, the loan indicator, and the G-index for 1117
unique firms; 725 of these firms have a loan at some point during our sample period.

In the remaining tables, we estimate equation (1) using a least-squares
regression. This is a standard difference-in-difference estimation that isolates
the effect of bank loans on firm value by exploiting both differences across
firms with and without loans and differences before and after firms obtain
loans.
B.

Bank Loans and Firm Value

Table 2 reports the results of our primary estimation. 122 We perform leastsquares regressions with firm fixed effects, which controls for unobserved firm
122

In each table, the top number in each cell is the regression coefficient, which indicates
the magnitude and direction of each variable’s relationship with Tobin’s Q. A negative
coefficient indicates that a variable has an inverse relationship with Tobin’s Q. For
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heterogeneity. This enables us to focus on variation within each firm. In both
columns, the loan indicator variable has a statistically significant positive
relationship with Tobin’s Q.123 This result indicates that within each firm, the
presence of a bank loan is associated with higher Tobin’s Q.

example, a negative coefficient on the loan variable would indicate that the presence of a
bank loan is associated with a decrease in Tobin’s Q. In contrast, a positive coefficient
indicates that a variable is associated with an increase in Tobin’s Q.
In addition, the table reports the t-statistic – a measure of statistical significance – for
each coefficient. In each cell, it is the bottom number. Coefficients with t-statistics with
absolute value equal to or greater than 1.645 are considered statistically significant at the
10% level, meaning that there is 90% certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. Tstatistics with absolute value equal to or greater than 1.96 indicate statistical significance at
the more certain 5% level, and t-statistics with absolute value equal to or greater than 2.576
indicate statistical significance at the most certain 1% level. Empiricists typically require tstatistics of at least 1.645 to conclude that one variable affects another in the direction
indicated by the coefficient. In the table, coefficients are marked with “*”, “**”, and “***”
to indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The table also reports R-squared statistics. R-squared statistics measure a regression’s
“goodness of fit,” as opposed to t-statistics, which measure the reliability of each individual
coefficient. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 34 (5th ed. 2003). In other
words, the R-squared measures how much of the overall variation in the dependent variable,
here Tobin’s Q, is explained by the explanatory variables. Id. at 33. Thus, the R-squared of
a regression will vary between 0 and 1. Id. When the R-squared value is 0, the explanatory
variables explain none of the dependent variable’s variation. Id. An R-squared of 1 means
that the explanatory variables explain all of the variation. Id. The closer the R-squared is to
1, the better the regression explains the data. Id.
123
For each of the estimations in Tables 2 through 7, we also performed the estimations
without control variables on the same sample of firms in the estimations with the full set of
controls (i.e., so that the samples match). We have no reason to think there is any selection
bias between the firms that do and do not have data for the full set of controls. Most of the
results are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude when we run the withoutcontrols regressions on the smaller sample, but occasionally, a previously significant
coefficient became insignificant. For brevity’s sake, we do not report the results.
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Table 2
Bank Loans and Firm Value
Variable
A
B
Loan Indicator
0.085*** 0.151***
2.79
2.73
-0.039*** -0.041**
G-index
-3.8
-2.05
-.00001***
Assets
-3.25
-0.001
Firm Age
-1.25
0.847***
ROA
7.26
2.579***
CAPEX/Assets
4.62
0.926***
Leverage
7.37
0.015***
R&D per Sales
5.08
Firm fixed effects? Yes
Yes
Number of
Observations
13710
6711
R-squared
0.628
0.622
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects, with and without control variables.
The dependent variable in all regressions is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of
assets is equal to the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock minus the
sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. We compute the
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by subtracting the median Tobin’s Q in the industry from each
firm’s Tobin’s Q, where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC code. The loan indicator is
equal to 1 for all years that firms had bank loans for all twelve months. The G-index ranges
from 0 to 24 to indicate the entrenchment provisions of each firm. ROA is net
income/assets. CAPEX/Assets is capital expenditures/assets. R&D per Sales is research
and development expenditures/total sales. Leverage is total debt/assets. Although not
shown in the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions. T-statistics appear below
the coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.

The size of the coefficients suggests the average real-world magnitude of a
change in Tobin’s Q associated with changes in each of the explanatory
variables. For example, when including the full set of financial controls (the
estimation reported in the second column), the coefficients suggest that,
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averaged across all firms and years, the presence of a loan increases Tobin’s Q
by 0.151, whereas a one-unit increase in the G-index decreases Tobin’s Q by
0.041. As a further example, for a firm without a loan and with Tobin’s Q of
0.876, which is the average industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for all firm-years
without a loan, the presence of a loan is expected to increase Q by 17%, to
1.027.
Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of the results in Table 2. The
average industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q during years when firms do not have a
loan is 0.876. Column B in Table 2 shows that the average Tobin’s Q is 0.151
higher during years when firms do have loans.124
Figure 1:
Average Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q With and Without a Loan

1.05
1
Industry-Adjusted Tobin's Q

0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
No Loan

Loan

124
Here, and in the regressions that follow, our findings likely understate the monitoring
benefits of bank debt because we assume each bank loan and its associated monitoring
continue for the entire term given in the loan contract. Limitations in the data preclude us
from identifying loans repaid before stated maturity or pinpointing when such early
retirements occur. Therefore, we unavoidably count some number of firm-year observations
as bank-monitored when in fact they are not.
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Exploring Simultaneity, Monitoring, and Alternative Theories

While the results from Table 2 indicate a positive correlation between the
presence of a bank loan and firm value, they do not prove our case that bank
monitoring improves firm value. First of all, bank loans might not necessarily
cause firm value to increase. Selection effects may suggest that causation runs
in the other direction: firms with higher Tobin’s Q are more likely to get bank
loans than firms with lower Tobin’s Q. 125 Alternatively, some unobservable
factor may be responsible for both firms’ obtaining bank loans and high
Tobin’s Q, so that a positive relationship between firm value and bank loans
could exist even if bank loans did not cause firm value to increase. For
example, a switch to better management personnel could both improve a firm’s
creditworthiness and also cause an increase in Tobin’s Q. These are
simultaneity concerns – some other factor may be at work simultaneously with
a bank loan that is responsible for our results. Another concern is selection on
unobservables: firms and banks select which firms will receive loans, so even
if all firms with loans showed bank monitoring-induced increases in Tobin’s
Q, we could not necessarily be sure that other firms that do not have loans
would also benefit from having one. While we control for observable
differences across firms, it may be that firms with loans differ across some
unobservable dimension from firms without loans, and that this difference
renders only the former susceptible to the beneficial effects of bank
monitoring.
Finally, even if the presence of a bank loan causes an increase in firm value,
bank monitoring may not be the only plausible explanation. The bank’s
willingness to lend to a given firm may simply signal positive private
information to stock markets about the firm’s creditworthiness or the strength
of its projects. The bank’s identification of the firm as a worthy borrower may
be what causes an increase in Tobin’s Q by resolving information asymmetry
for the markets, independent of any subsequent monitoring by the bank.
In the subsequent tables, we offer evidence discounting the possibility that
simultaneity accounts for our observed increases in firm value in the presence
of bank loans. In addition, our results below support our claim that bank
monitoring is at least partly responsible for observed increases in firm value.
1.

Simultaneity

As a first check on the direction of causation, we ran unreported pooled
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, similar to the estimations in Table
2 but without fixed effects. Our results tend to suggest causation runs in the
direction we think. Both with and without financial controls, the loan indicator
125
Krishnaswami, supra note 65, at 420 (finding a significant positive relation between a
firm’s market-to-book ratio and the proportion of its debt that is private debt). Their
measure of market-to-book ratio may be highly correlated with Tobin’s Q, which would
suggest that firms with bank loans may simply have higher adjusted Tobin’s Q even if bank
monitoring had no effect.
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variable has a statistically significant negative relationship with Tobin’s Q.
This indicates that in a standard cross-sectional relationship, firms with loans
have lower Tobin’s Q than firms without loans. Therefore, it does not appear
that firms start with high Tobin’s Q and then get bank loans.
In Table 3 we explore this issue further. We attempt to determine whether,
as between firms with and without bank loans, systematic differences exist that
may be responsible for the positive relationship between loans and firm value.
If such a systematic difference exists – again, consider the improved
management example – which explains both why certain firms get bank loans
and why those firms have higher value, then our causal attribution would be
spurious. In that case, bank monitoring could not be said to cause the observed
increases in firm value.
We run regressions with firm fixed effects, restricting our sample to:
(a) firms in our sample that have a loan at some point during our sample period
(the “Loan Firms”) (Cols. A & B); (b) Loan Firms and only comparing the
period before the loan with the period during the loan (Cols. C & D); and
(c) Loan Firms and only comparing the period during the loan with the period
after the loan’s retirement (Cols. E & F). These three specifications test
whether a selection effect is driving our results. By limiting the analysis only
to Loan Firms, we control for other fundamental differences between Loan
Firms and other firms that may be causing a higher Tobin’s Q. Moreover, if
we are able to confirm that Tobin’s Q both increases when firms get loans and
decreases when firms retire loans, we minimize the possibility that an
unobserved factor is responsible both for firms obtaining loans and for
increases in Tobin’s Q. It is unlikely that the effect of this unobserved factor
would suddenly appear when a loan was obtained – causing a timely increase
in Tobin’s Q – and then disappear when a loan was retired, causing a timely
decrease.
For all the estimations using the full set of controls (Cols. B, D, and F), the
loan’s effect on Tobin’s Q is positive and significant, providing strong
evidence of a positive relation between bank monitoring and Tobin’s Q. It is
therefore unlikely that simultaneity is responsible for the positive relationship
between bank loans and firm value.
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Notes on Table 3: This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the
dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculation of industryadjusted Tobin's Q, along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2.
Columns A and B report estimations where the sample includes only firms that have loans
during our sample period. Columns C and D report estimations on only the Loan Firms and
only comparing the period before the loan with the period during the loan. Columns E and
F report estimations on only the Loan Firms and only comparing the loan period with the
period following the loan’s retirement. Columns G and H report estimations on all firms,
but controlling for Tobin’s Q in the year before firms get bank loans. In Columns I and J,
our sample includes only firm-years where either (a) the firm has no loan; or (b) the firm’s
only loan(s) are for working capital, debt repayment, or commercial paper backup purposes,
which are generally unrelated to the financing of good projects. The loan indicator is equal
to 1 for only the years that a firm had such a bank loan. Although not shown in the tables,
year and firm dummies are included in all regressions. T-statistics appear below the
coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and
1% respectively.

Figure 2 graphically represents the before, during, and after results from
Table 3 that include the full set of financial controls. The average industryadjusted Tobin’s Q for our sample firms in the period before they have a loan
is 0.656. Column D in Table 3 shows that the average Tobin’s Q goes up by
0.1 when these firms obtain a loan, and Column F shows that the average
Tobin’s Q decreases by 0.142 when these firms retire their loans.
Figure 2:
Average Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q Before, During, and After Loan

Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q

0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
0.4
Before Loan

During Loan

After Loan
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As an additional test, we run firm fixed effects regressions for the entire
sample of firms, also controlling for Tobin’s Q in the year before each firm
obtains a bank loan (Cols. G & H).126 This control variable will capture nonloan factors that may have increased firm value before the loan period and that
would therefore produce a spurious positive correlation between a bank loan
and Tobin’s Q. The loan’s effect remains positive and significant in
estimations both with and without controls. This provides further comfort that
the positive association we find between bank loans and firm value is not
driven by some non-loan factor.
2.

Monitoring Versus Information Asymmetry Theories

The results in Columns E through F and I through J in Table 3 also support
our hypothesis that bank monitoring – as distinguished from resolution of
information asymmetry – is at least partly responsible for improving firm
value.
The results in Columns C and D, comparing the period before the loan with
the period during the loan, are consistent with both a monitoring theory and an
information asymmetry theory. An increase in a firm’s Tobin’s Q during the
loan period as compared to the preceding period may be explained by the
market’s initial revaluation of the firm in light of the new information
conveyed by the bank’s lending decision. Or, the value added by bank
monitoring over the term of the loan could explain the increase in Tobin’s Q.
However, the results in Columns E and F, comparing the periods during and
after the loan, are best explained by the monitoring theory. The drop in
Tobin’s Q with the loan’s retirement can be explained by the absence of the
bank monitor, but it is not likely a result of any new information revealed by
the loan’s retirement. 127 To the extent that a bank’s lending decision conveys a
positive signal to the market regarding, for example, the firm’s growth

126

According to our coding convention, a firm’s loan indicator variable is set to 1 only in
years when the firm had a bank loan for all twelve months. Therefore, our control here
operates as to the year that is two years prior to the year that our loan indicator is first
triggered.
127
The suggestion has been made that a loan’s retirement without renewal may signal the
bank’s assessment that the firm lacks good projects. However, it is far more likely that the
firm merely chose alternative financing, probably in the form of public debt, which is
cheaper than private debt above a certain issue size. Krishnaswami, supra note 65, at 41922. Firms may borrow in private debt markets until they establish a good credit history, at
which point they turn to cheaper public debt. Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and
Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON.
689, 690 (1991) (theorizing that firms may first build reputations as good borrowers in
private debt markets before turning to public debt); Datta, supra note 9, at 448 (finding
evidence consistent with Diamond’s reputation-building hypothesis by showing a negative
association between the length of pre-existing bank-firm relationships and at-issue yield
spreads for new public debt).
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prospects or the promise of its projects, we have no reason to expect the
direction of this signal to change simultaneously with the maturity of the loan.
Finally, in Columns I and J, we run estimations seeking to isolate the
potential monitoring effects of bank loans on firm value. We borrow a strategy
from Christopher James’ pathbreaking article on the uniqueness of bank
loans.128 As earlier noted, James categorizes loans and other financings by
stated purpose and compares abnormal stock returns across categories
following the public announcements of the debt financings. As between bank
loans for debt refinancing and bank loans for capital expenditures, he finds no
significant difference in stock price response. He concludes that the positive
abnormal returns from new bank loan announcements cannot be explained
solely by an information asymmetry theory. 129 While loans for capital
expenditures may signal that the bank has private information about the firm’s
growth prospects, refinancing loans convey no such signal. The absence of
any significant difference in stock price response to an announcement of these
two different categories of loans implies that the information asymmetry
theory offers at best an incomplete explanation.
Like James, we divide our sample based on the purpose of each loan. We
measure the effects of only those loans least likely to offer new information to
the public markets about the firm’s growth prospects or the quality of its
projects. Increases in Tobin’s Q associated with these “no-information” loans
would strongly support a monitoring theory. To identify these loans, we look
to the loan’s primary purpose as indicated in the DealScan database. We
include only loans for working capital, debt repayment, and commercial paper
backup purposes in our set of no-information loans. 130 Working capital loans
are typically used for the short-term financing of ordinary course purchases of
inventory or other ordinary course operations. Debt repayment loans simply
refinance existing debt. A commercial paper backup loan is a bank
commitment that backstops the borrower’s outstanding commercial paper. 131
The loan commitment assures that the borrower can pay off its commercial
paper coming due should it find itself unable to roll over or otherwise refinance
the paper. These types of loans seem to convey no strong positive information
to public markets about the borrower firm’s growth prospects.

128

See James, supra note 10.
See id. at 228-29.
130
Other purposes identified with significant numbers of loans in the DealScan database
include general corporate, acquisition, capital expenditure, leveraged buyout, project
finance, real estate, recapitalization, takeover, trade finance, and other.
131
Commercial paper is a low-risk short-term money-market security that firms typically
issue in order to manage working capital. Maturities do not exceed nine months, and
proceeds are typically used for current transactions and not long-term investments. Because
of their low-risk features, they are exempt from Securities Act registration. Federal Reserve
Board: About Commercial Paper, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/CP/about.htm
(last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
129
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We compare the effects of these no-information loans to firm-years in which
there is no loan. For our models in Columns I and J, our sample includes only
firm-years where either (a) the firm has no loan; or (b) the firm’s only loan(s)
are no-information loans. We ignore all other firm-years – i.e., firm-years in
which a firm has a loan other than a no-information loan. Consistent with
James’ findings, our fixed-effect estimations show positive and significant
coefficients on the loan indicator, demonstrating that no-information loans are
associated with increases in Tobin’s Q.132 This result offers further support for
our hypothesis that bank loans enhance firm value because of the monitoring
that banks perform.133
Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest it is unlikely that our results are
explained by reverse causality or selection bias where only high-valued firms
get loans. Our results also discount the possibility that an omitted factor is
responsible both for firms obtaining loans and increases in Tobin’s Q.
Moreover, our results are also consistent with our claim that the loan indicator
is not just a proxy for the existence of good projects, but that bank monitoring
is at least partly responsible for the positive correlation between loans and firm
value.
Selection issues remain, however. While we attempt to account for
unobservable factors with controls and with our before-after approach looking
at only Loan Firms, we are cautious about what this may tell us about nonLoan Firms. It is possible, for example, that unobservable differences exist
between Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms, such that bank monitoring may only
benefit Loan Firms. The most convincing test of bank monitoring would
require random assignment of loans across capital-raising firms. Neither this
sort of experiment nor a convincing natural experiment exists. Accordingly,
while our non-experimental analyses are imperfect, they represent the best
analyses currently possible.
D.

Interactions with Managerial Entrenchment and Free Cash Flow

In this Section, we investigate the value-enhancing prospects for bank
monitoring in specific contexts suggesting severe agency costs. Bank
monitoring may be especially important in these contexts. We first consider
agency costs induced by conventional corporate governance arrangements: we

132

We also ran regressions estimating the effect of loans that would typically be
considered “high-information loans”: loans for acquisitions, capital expenditures, equipment
purchases, project finance, real estate, stock buyouts, and takeovers. Unfortunately, there
are only 672 observations in our sample where firms have loans only for these purposes.
The results are statistically insignificant.
133
This may not be definitive, of course. While we believe, like James, that our noinformation loans convey little or no positive private information about the firm to the
market, to the extent these loans do send a positive signal, our monitoring explanation is
weaker. See James, supra note 10, at 228-29.
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explore bank monitoring in the face of managerial entrenchment. 134 We then
test the value of bank monitoring when firms have high free cash flow. 135
Finally, we address bank monitoring in the presence of both entrenchment and
high free cash flow.
1.

Interactions with Managerial Entrenchment

In Table 4, we test the effect of bank monitoring on firm value in the
presence of specific corporate governance arrangements. GIM and BCF have
shown a negative correlation between managerial entrenchment and firm
value.136 We hypothesize that bank monitoring may mitigate the valuedecreasing effects of management entrenchment. Banks’ continuing oversight
of firms’ compliance with financial covenants and operating and investment
restrictions may constrain managers despite the slack that entrenchment
affords. In Table 4, we interact our loan indicator with several measures of
entrenchment. The interaction allows us to observe not simply the effect of,
say, the G-index on all firms (Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms), but to observe
the effect of the G-index on Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms separately. We
include GIM’s G-Index (Cols. A & B), BCF’s E-Index (Cols. C & D), and a
Poison Pill indicator (Cols. E & F).137 While we also test interactions between
the loan indicator and the other provisions in BCF’s E-Index, none of these
interactions are statistically significant, and we do not show the results in our
tables.
Although the total effect of the loan indicator is positive and significant in
all specifications, and the measures of managerial entrenchment are negative
and significant in all specifications, the interaction between bank loans and our
governance indices do not show statistical significance. The only significant
interaction variable is the interaction between the loan indicator and the poison
pill indicator in the absence of controls. This suggests that the poison pill is
the only entrenchment measure that affects firm value differently as between
Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms. The positive coefficient suggests that the
presence of a loan may offset the value-decreasing effect of a poison pill. This
evidence is only weakly suggestive, but we have more to say about the
interaction of bank monitoring with governance indices and individual
entrenching provisions in Section 3 below.

134

See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing entrenchment and its relation to agency costs).
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the agency costs of free cash flow).
136
See Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 29, at 53; Gompers et al., supra note 2,
at 120.
137
The Poison Pill indicator is set to 1 when a firm has a poison pill. See infra Part
III.D.4 (discussing poison pills).
135
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Table 4
Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Entrenchment Provisions
Variable

A

B

C

D

E

F

Loan Indicator

0.046
0.49

0.233
1.4

0.069
1.34

0.186*
1.94

0.021
0.49

0.162**
1.96

G-index

-0.041***

-0.038*

-3.74

-1.79

Loan Indicator

0.004

-0.009

* G-index

0.45

-0.52
-0.075***

-0.073*

-3.71

-1.82

0.008

-0.016

0.43

-0.45
-0.262***

-0.211**

-5.98

-2.52

Loan Indicator

0.11**

-0.025

* Poison Pill

2.22

-0.26

E-index
Loan Indicator
* E-index
Poison Pill

Assets
Firm Age
ROA
CAPEX/Assets
Leverage
R&D per Sales

-.00001***

-.00001***

-.00001***

-3.27

-3.3

-3.58

-0.001

-0.001

-0.001

-1.21

-1.36

-0.86

0.848***

0.841***

1.155***

7.26

7.21

6.91

2.578***

2.582***

2.968***

4.62

4.62

5.19

0.926***

0.914***

0.888***

7.37

7.28

5.98

0.015***

0.015***

0.017***

5.08

5.13

4.31

Total Effect of

0.084***

0.155***

0.087***

0.151***

0.083***

0.148***

Loan
Indicator

2.76

2.78

2.84

2.74

2.72

2.66

Number of
Observations

13710

6711

13710

6711

13710

6359

R-squared

0.628

0.622

0.628

0.622

0.629

0.629

This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculation of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q,
along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2. Columns A and B report
estimations including an interaction between the G-index and the loan indicator; Columns C
and D include an interaction between the E-index and the loan indicator; and Columns E
and F include an interaction between the loan indicator and the Poison Pill indicator. The
total effect of the loan indicator on Tobin’s Q is the coefficient on the loan indicator plus the
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coefficient on the interaction variable multiplied by the mean percentage of G-index/Eindex/Poison Pill, respectively. Although not shown in the tables, year dummies and firm
fixed effects are included in all regressions. T-statistics appear below the coefficient
estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.

2.

Interactions with Free Cash Flow

Next, in Table 5 we explore the effect of bank loans and free cash flow on
firm value. We include free cash flow because it is one of the primary
channels through which managers may act in their self-interest – spending free
cash on perquisites or empire-building, for example – to the detriment of
shareholders.138 The presence of a bank loan, however, may reduce these
agency costs by monitoring managers’ use of discretionary funds. Controlling
for entrenchment with the G-index, we use interaction variables to determine
whether the positive effect of bank monitoring on firm value is stronger in
firms with higher free cash flow, where agency costs are potentially higher.
For our measure of free cash flow, we use operating income minus interest
expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, scaled by the
book value of the firm’s assets. For estimations without interactions (Cols. A
& B), the results indicate that, controlling for entrenchment, the loan indicator
has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q, while free cash flow is not
statistically significant. This is consistent with our earlier findings on the
positive association between bank monitoring and firm value, though it says
little about the effect of free cash flow. However, when we include the
interactions between free cash flow and the loan indicator (Cols. C & D), we
find a negative coefficient on the independent free cash flow variable and a
positive coefficient on the interaction term. Together these coefficients
suggest that: (a) when bank monitoring exists to control agency costs of free
cash flow, free cash flow may improve firm value; but (b) in the absence of
bank monitoring, the agency costs associated with free cash flow may reduce
firm value.139 Finally, in the last two columns (Cols. E & F), we add a third
interaction term, an indicator variable (“Top 1/3”) for the firms in our sample
that rank in the top one-third in terms of free cash flow. For these firms, the
indicator is set to one, and it is set to zero otherwise. The positive and
significant coefficient on the triple interaction of the loan indicator, free cash
flow, and Top 1/3 indicates that the positive effect of bank monitoring and free
cash flow on firm value is especially strong for firms with higher free cash
flow. Overall, our results strongly suggest that bank monitoring interacts with
138

See supra Part II.A.3 (defining free cash flow).
In both these regressions and Columns E and F, the negative coefficient on the
independent loan indicator variable is not meaningful, given these interactive models.
Technically, it shows the effect of a loan when free cash flow is zero, which will never
occur. In any event, the total effect of the loan in each model is still positive, a result we
have not included in the table.
139
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free cash flow to enhance firm value. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that the value-enhancing effect of bank monitoring may matter most where
agency costs are high.
Table 5
Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Free Cash Flow
Variable

A

B

C

D

E

F

Loan Indicator

0.087***
2.81

0.149***
2.7

-0.273***
-6.84

-0.23***
-3.24

-0.243***
-6.07

-0.194***
-2.74

Free Cash
Flow

-0.122

-0.348

-0.458***

-0.926***

-0.443***

-0.891***

-1.54

-1.55

-5.57

-3.97

-5.4

-3.84

3.075***

3.398***

1.624***

1.544***

14.01

8.4

5.61

3.09

1.884***

2.739***

7.65

6.3

Loan Indicator
* Free Cash
Flow
Loan Indicator
* Free Cash
Flow * Top 1/3
G-index

-0.037***

-0.037*

-0.037***

-0.036*

-0.036***

-0.034*

-3.59

-1.86

-3.59

-1.82

-3.51

-1.7

Assets
Firm Age
ROA
CAPEX/Assets
Leverage
R&D per Sales

-.00001***

-.00001***

-.00001***

-3.5

-3.74

-3.83

-.0004

-.0003

-.0003

-0.62

-0.48

-0.54

1.163***

1.18***

1.188***

6.95

7.1

7.17

2.957***

2.648***

2.446***

5.16

4.65

4.3

0.891***

0.697***

0.72***

5.99

4.67

4.83

0.016***

0.009***

0.01**

4.24

2.41

2.51

Firm fixed
effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of
Observations
R-squared

12833

6359

12833

6359

12833

6359

0.637

0.629

0.643

0.633

0.645

0.636

This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculation of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q,
along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2. We add free cash flow
measures to the estimations reported in this table, where our measure of free cash flow is
calculated as operating income minus the sum of the following components: (a) total income
taxes minus the change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year; (b)
gross interest expenses on debt; (c) dividend payments on preferred stocks; and (d) dividend
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payments on common stocks. This is divided by the firm’s book value of assets. Columns
A and B report estimations including the free cash flow measure; Columns C and D add an
interaction between free cash flow and the loan indicator; Columns E and F add an
additional interaction term between the loan indicator, free cash flow, and an indicator
variable for firms with free cash flow in the top 1/3 of our sample. Although not shown in
the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions. T-statistics appear below the
coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.

3.

Interactions with Managerial Entrenchment and Free Cash Flow

The results from Table 5 above suggest that bank monitoring may improve
managers’ use of discretionary cash to increase firm value. In Tables 6 and 7,
we explore the effects of bank loans, management entrenchment, and free cash
flow on firm value. We test for value-enhancing effects of bank loans, now in
the context of specific entrenchment arrangements. Specifically, we test for
the effects of free cash flow on firm value for a given level of entrenchment,
and then test to see whether the presence of a loan affects this interaction of
free cash flow and management entrenchment. We interact our bank loan
indicator with free cash flow and various measures of management
entrenchment. In Table 6, for our measures of entrenchment we use our two
governance indices – the G-index and E-index. In Table 7, our measures of
entrenchment are each of the six individual entrenchment provisions
comprising the E-index.
Our results in Table 6 support the findings of Table 5. We find that for a
given level of entrenchment, free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring
improves firm value. In Columns A and B of Table 6, we see positive and
significant coefficients on the interaction of free cash flow and the G-index,
indicating that for a given governance quality, firm value increases with free
cash flow.140 When we interact the loan indicator with free cash flow and the
G-index, we similarly find a positive and significant relation to firm value.
This suggests that for a given governance quality (a given level of
entrenchment), free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring may improve
firm value. We obtain similar results in Columns C and D, where we use the
E-index as our entrenchment measure, though in the model with full controls,
the coefficient is insignificant.

140

A recent empirical study finds evidence of a negative relationship between firm value
and the interaction between free cash flow and managerial entrenchment. Jianxin (Daniel)
Chi & D. Scott Lee, The Conditional Nature of the Value of Corporate Governance 22 tbl.3
(June 6, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Our specification differs
somewhat from theirs. In all of our estimations reported in Tables 6 and 7, we consistently
find a positive and significant relationship between firm value and the interaction of free
cash flow with our entrenchment measures.

2008]

THE CASE OF BANK MONITORING

1033

Table 6
Bank Loans and Firm Value:
Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Governance Indices
Variable

A

B

C

D

Loan Indicator

-0.145***
-3.54
-2.011***
-6.94
-0.073***
-6.58
0.243***
5.81
0.209***
8.52

-0.055***
-0.74
-2.692***
-4.92
-0.072***
-3.41
0.284***
3.83
0.189***
4.18

0.01
0.28
-0.726***
-8.1

0.117*
1.75
-1.122***
-4.73

-0.166***
-8.48
0.759***
11.25
0.286***
3.38

Free Cash Flow
G-index
Free Cash Flow *
G-index
Free Cash Flow * GIndex * Loan Indicator
E-index
Free Cash Flow
* E-index
Free Cash Flow * EIndex * Loan Indicator
Assets

Firm fixed effects?

Yes

-.00001***
-3.75
-.0003
-0.53
1.182***
7.1
2.694***
4.72
0.626***
4.11
0.012***
3.01
Yes

Number of
Observations
R-squared

12833
0.643

6359
0.633

Firm Age
ROA
CAPEX/Assets
Leverage
R&D per Sales

Yes

-0.17***
-4.36
0.973***
8.08
0.132
0.82
-.00001***
-3.83
-.00032
-0.52
1.068***
6.42
2.607***
4.58
0.444***
2.86
0.015***
3.82
Yes

12833
0.643

6359
0.635

This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculations of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q,
free cash flow, and the other control variables in Table 2. This table reports estimations that
include interactions between free cash flow and two governance indices (the G-index and Eindex) and among free cash flow, the governance indices, and the loan indicator. In
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Columns A and B, the governance index is GIM’s G-index. In Columns C and D, the
governance index is BCF’s E-index. Although not shown in the tables, year dummies are
included in all regressions. T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates. Significance
levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

For estimations reported in Table 7, we use similar specifications, except
that instead of a governance index, we interact using the six individual
entrenchment provisions from the E-index. Our results are largely consistent
with those in Table 6. Regarding interactions between free cash flow and
individual entrenchment provisions, we find that firm value increases with free
cash flow, given the presence of any of the following: a poison pill, a
supermajority requirement for mergers, a staggered board, limits to bylaw
amendments, and golden parachutes. Coefficients are positive and significant
in each model – with and without controls. Only limits on charter amendments
have no statistically significant interactive effect with free cash flow. When
we include the loan indicator in the interaction, we find positive and
statistically significant interactions in the presence of staggered boards, poison
pills (in the specification without the full set of controls), and golden
parachutes (in the specification with the full set of controls). These results
suggest that with any of these three entrenching provisions, free cash flow in
the presence of bank monitoring improves firm value.
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Table 7
Bank Loans and Firm Value:
Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Entrenchent Provisions
Variable

A

B

C

D

E

F

Loan Indicator

-0.008
-0.23

0.112*
1.74

0.078**
2.44

0.153***
2.67

0.017
0.48

0.07
1.07

Free Cash Flow

-0.624***

-1.044***

-0.177**

-0.432*

-0.645***

-0.952***

-7.2

-4.45

-2.18

-1.91

-7.36

-4.09

-0.524***

-0.546***

-12.1

-7.0

Free Cash Flow
* Poison Pill

2.16***

2.716***

10.61

7.94

Free Cash Flow
* Poison Pill
*Loan Indicator

1.258***

0.49

4.98

1.07

Supermajority
for Merger

-0.121

-0.228

-1.49

-1.44

Free Cash Flow
*Supermajority

1.133***

2.235***

2.87

2.66

Free Cash Flow
*Supermajority
*Loan Indicator

0.402

-0.124

0.87

-0.14

Staggered
Board

-0.34***

-0.168

-4.91

-1.11

Free Cash Flow
* Staggered
Board

2.29***

2.61***

11.07

7.27

Free Cash Flow
*Staggered
Board * Loan
Indicator
Firm fixed
effects?

0.911***

1.055**

3.57

2.18

Poison Pill

Full Set of
Controls
Number of
Observations
R-squared

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

12833

6359

12833

6359

12833

6359

0.644

0.635

0.637

0.629

0.643

0.634
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Table 7 (continued)
Bank Loans and Firm Value:
Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Entrenchment Provisions
Variable

A

B

C

D

E

F

Loan Indicator

0.089***
2.81

0.153***
2.72

0.087***
2.79

0.151***
2.7

0.051
1.48

0.137**
2.21

Free Cash Flow

-0.223***

-0.422*

-0.127

-0.342

-0.472***

-0.836***

-2.72

-1.88

-1.59

-1.52

-5.51

-3.52

Limits to
Amend Bylaws

-0.336***

-0.442***

-4.37

-2.98

Free Cash Flow
* Limits to
Amend Bylaws

1.514***

2.278***

4.69

4.25

Free Cash Flow
* Limits to
Amend Bylaws
*Loan Indicator
Limits to
Amend Charter

-0.239

-0.32

-0.59

-0.36
-0.145

0.011

-0.91

0.03

Free Cash Flow
* Limits to
*
Amend Charter

0.88

0.709

0.9

0.34

Free Cash Flow
* Limits to
Amend Charter
*Loan Indicator

-0.053

-0.594

-0.05

-0.21

Golden
Parachute

-0.236***

-0.192***

-6.04

-2.63

Free Cash Flow
* Golden
Parachute

1.701***

2.089***

8.46

5.32

Free Cash Flow
* Golden
Parachute *
Loan Indicator
Firm fixed
effects?
Full set of
Controls

0.498**

0.194

1.99

0.39

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Number of
Observations

12833

6359

12833

6359

12833

6359

R-squared

0.637

0.63

0.636

0.628

0.64

0.631

This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculations of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q,
free cash flow, and the other control variables in Table 2. This table reports estimations that
include interactions between free cash flow and the three entrenchment provisions and

2008]

THE CASE OF BANK MONITORING

1037

among free cash flow, the entrenchment provisions, and the loan indicator. Although not
shown in the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions. The full set of controls
found in Tables 2 through 6 are included in the estimations reported in Columns B, D, and
F, but omitted for brevity. T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates. Significance
levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.

Strong Entrenchment: When Bank Monitoring May Matter Most

Why might bank monitoring have this value-enhancing effect with free cash
flow in the presence of these three entrenchment provisions, but not with the
other entrenchment provisions that also merit inclusion in the E-index? Again,
it may be that bank monitoring matters most in situations with high agency
costs. These three provisions – staggered boards, poison pills, and golden
parachutes – have direct relevance for managerial slack and entrenchment,
while the others arguably do not.
Our estimations involving the staggered board offer our strongest results for
the value of bank monitoring. Consistent with our high agency cost theory, the
corporate governance literature recognizes the special potency of the staggered
board as an entrenching device. 141 An effective staggered board prevents the
timely ouster of a majority of the firm’s board of directors, requiring even a
majority of shareholders to wait through at least two annual elections to
accomplish the task.142 This delay in gaining control of the firm strongly
deters a proxy fight or other hostile takeover. Moreover, Lucian Bebchuk and
Alma Cohen offer empirical evidence suggesting that a staggered board
reduces firm value. 143 Similarly, the poison pill has been recognized as
another potent entrenchment tool, especially when used in combination with a
staggered board. 144 A poison pill effectively precludes a hostile acquirer from
purchasing a block of the target’s stock above some percentage threshold. 145 It
141
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Joan C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
887, 890 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards]; Bebchuk & Cohen,
Entrenched Boards, supra note 24, at 411.
142
A staggered board is most effective when the firm’s governance arrangements do not
permit shareholders to: (a) effect amendments that unstagger the board; (b) increase the
number of board seats and fill them; or (c) remove directors without cause. Our data do not
distinguish among levels of effectiveness for staggered boards. This only biases our sample
against us, however.
143
See Bebchuk & Cohen, Entrenched Boards, supra note 24, at 421-28.
144
See id. at 412 (“Staggered boards also protect incumbents from removal via a hostile
takeover because of the interaction between incumbents and a board’s power to adopt and
maintain a poison pill.”); Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 141, at 904.
145
Some have cautioned not to overrate the presence of a pill, since a firm without a pill
can always adopt one without shareholder approval, even in the face of a hostile bid. John
C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 337 (2000). So even a firm without a pill is protected by a
“shadow pill.” Id. On the other hand, whether a pill is in place or not may have a signaling
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does this by diluting the value of the acquirer’s stock in the target firm once the
percentage threshold is reached. 146 The standard maneuver to defeat a pill is to
obtain control of the board in order to redeem the pill. But an effective
staggered board prevents this approach. So, together the pill and the staggered
board offer very strong entrenchment. 147
The golden parachute operates a bit differently from these other two devices
in creating agency costs. A golden parachute promises incumbent managers a
handsome payout upon a change of control of the firm. The parachute in effect
offers a soft landing for ousted executives. Unlike other “entrenching”
provisions, the parachute generates agency costs not by insulating managers
from the takeover market, but by easing their transition to unemployment. By
reducing the sting of takeover market discipline, the parachute may encourage
managerial slack.148
By comparison, for three provisions of the E-index – supermajority voting
for mergers, limits to by-law amendments, and limits to charter amendments –
the joint interactions with free cash flow and the loan indicator in Table 7
produce no significant results. This lack of results might be explained by the
fact that these three provisions are in some sense second-order entrenchment
devices that do not by themselves directly protect managers from hostile
takeovers. Limits to by-law and charter amendments do not directly enable
managerial slack. Instead, they prevent shareholder modification of other
provisions – namely, staggered boards and poison pills – that do directly
entrench managers by shielding them from capital market discipline.
Similarly, a supermajority voting requirement for mergers seems of secondary
importance for entrenchment purposes because shareholders would only get to
vote on a merger proposal after its approval by the board. Therefore, a
supermajority requirement would matter in a hostile takeover context only if
management lost control of the board – i.e., if the staggered board were
effect to potential acquirers. A pill in place may signal the board’s determination to fight
any hostile bid, while the absence of a pill – or the removal of an existing pill – may signal
management’s “softness” to a potential acquirer. Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note
29, at 10. The shadow pill phenomenon may partly explain why we do not obtain stronger
results in the interaction of free cash flow, poison pill, and the loan indicator. See pp. 10351036 tbl.7 cols.A & B.
146
The dilution is effected by issuing rights to all stockholders to purchase securities –
typically of the target but sometimes of the acquirer – at steep discounts once the acquirer’s
stock holdings in the target exceed the specified percentage threshold. The rights may be
exercised by all stockholders except the unwanted acquirer.
147
The empirical results of Brown and Caylor confirm that the absence of staggered
boards and poison pills is important for firm value. See Brown & Caylor, supra note 32, at
422.
148
Of course, this may benefit shareholders to the extent it renders management more
amenable to a takeover. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871,
884 (2002).
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ineffective at preventing a loss of control. Supermajority requirements, then,
offer only a “second line of defense.” 149
In general, our results are consistent with the idea that free cash flow with
strong entrenchment may present a situation where bank monitoring matters
most. That is, bank oversight of managers’ use of discretionary funds may add
the most value when agency costs are highest – when strong entrenchment
would otherwise encourage managers to squander free cash.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our study is the first to integrate into the empirical corporate governance
literature a careful consideration of the effects of bank monitoring for reducing
agency costs. Using the established measure of Tobin’s Q for firm value, we
find evidence consistent with our hypothesis that bank monitoring adds value.
Controlling for the G-index and for potential simultaneity, we find a positive
and significant relation between firm value and the presence of a bank loan.
This suggests that bank monitoring may help counteract the value-decreasing
effect of managerial entrenchment. In addition, using measures of free cash
flow to differentiate companies with high agency costs, we find that bank
monitoring interacts with free cash flow to enhance firm value. Finally, we
investigate interactions among our loan indicator, free cash flow, and various
measures of governance quality. Our results suggest first that, for a given
quality of corporate governance, free cash flow in the presence of bank
monitoring improves firm value. Second, differentiating among E-index
provisions, we find results consistent with our claim that bank monitoring may
matter most when strong entrenchment would otherwise encourage managers
to squander free cash – i.e., when agency costs are high.
More generally, our findings strongly suggest that corporate governance
may involve more than just corporate law. Contracting parties may share an
interest with shareholders in controlling managerial agency costs. Bank
monitoring may perform such a function even outside the confines of financial
distress. Bank governance may substitute for conventional modes of corporate
governance. This potential for bank monitoring as a governance device has
important implications in a number of areas.
A.

Reconceptualizing Regulation of Creditors and Credit Markets

A fundamental rethinking may be in order for various legal doctrines and
regulatory structures that affect bank lending and banks’ exercise of their
creditor remedies. Every few decades, for example, court-created doctrines
arise to protect borrowers through equitable policing of bank collection
efforts.150 Lender liability became a big concern for bankers in the 1980s, 151

149

Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 29, at 9.
See generally Jonathan M. Landers, Deepening Insolvency Comes of Age, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 5, 2006 (describing a history of court-created doctrines to protect borrowers ex post).
150
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despite the fact that in only a handful of egregious cases did courts actually pin
liability on a bank.152 Now in the 2000s, the confused doctrine of deepening
insolvency has been recognized by at least a few courts as a separate cause of
action against a lender.153 To the extent these doctrines impede banks from
exercising their contract remedies, the doctrines may tend to reduce firm value
in the aggregate. A given firm may be spared the scythe, but overall, impeding
creditor collection may simply facilitate managerial slack. 154 Further empirical
research may show this to be the case.
Similarly, regulatory changes that affect the availability of bank credit may
potentially affect firm value, not simply by affecting financing options but by
affecting the availability of bank monitoring for public companies. 155 A whole
host of other regulatory structures might also indirectly affect the efficacy of
bank monitoring for borrower firm value. As noted earlier, for example, risk
diversification by lead banks may reduce their incentive to monitor. 156
Deepening loan markets and markets for credit derivatives offer banks the
ability to shed risk. Regulatory intervention in these markets that affect banks’
risk diversification strategies may therefore indirectly affect borrower firm
values by altering bank monitoring incentives. These many regulatory areas
deserve further attention from researchers and policy makers.157

151

See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 143-44
(1989).
152
See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761-62 (6th Cir. 1985)
(imposing a duty of good faith on the lender in demanding repayment, and finding that the
lender had an obligation to give notice before refusing to advance funds under a line of
credit).
153
In re Exide Technologies, Inc., 299 B.R. 732, 750-52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)
(upholding a deepening insolvency claim against the debtors’ secured lenders for causing
the debtors to fraudulently continue operating the business long after the debtors should
have been liquidated); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R. F. Lafferty &
Co., 267 F.2d 340, 349 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding an independent cause of action against firm
managers and third parties for improperly expanding corporate debt and prolonging the life
of an insolvent company). As happened with lender liability, however, courts appear to be
abandoning the cause of action for deepening insolvency. Hugh M. McDonald, Todd S.
Fishman & Laura Martin, Lafferty’s Orphan: The Abandonment of Deepening Insolvency,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 26, 2008, at 1.
154
Cf. Fischel, supra note 151, at 151 (commenting that imposition of extracontractual
duties upon lenders encourages borrower opportunism).
155
For example, reserve requirements are set by the Federal Reserve in order to assure
bank solvency. Reserve requirements specify the amount of funds that a depository
institution must hold in reserve against its deposit liabilities. Ceretis parabis, a higher
reserve requirement means less bank lending overall.
156
See supra Part II.B.2.
157
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy 1 (Dec. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Implications for Future Research

The design of empirical corporate governance research should account for
bank governance. Otherwise, results may be biased. In addition, further
investigation of interactions among bank loans, various governance
arrangements, and firm characteristics may prove fruitful. We have taken a
first step in this direction, but many questions remain.
More generally, bank governance itself has been understudied. We have
proffered initial evidence that bank monitoring is associated with increases in
firm value. Further exploration of the details of bank lending arrangements
may help identify specific loan terms – specific covenants or reporting
obligations, for example – that may be especially important for effective bank
monitoring. Optimal loan terms for this purpose may vary by industry or other
firm characteristics.158
Finally, besides bank loans, other important sources of contract governance
and monitoring may exist. Researchers have suggested, for example, that
insurers of directors’ and officers’ liability risk may be effective monitors. 159
Other firm contracts may also include monitoring arrangements that not only
protect the particular contracting party but also improve firm value. Labor
agreements and major supply contracts, for example, may be fruitful targets for
empirical research.
***
We know that corporate law matters. We also know a fair bit about which
specific corporate governance provisions matter. But what else matters? Our
article takes a first step in answering this important but underappreciated
question. Bank monitoring may serve an important governance function,
improving firm value by constraining managerial slack that eludes
conventional corporate governance arrangements.

158

One study finds, for example, that small firms generally have weaker corporate
governance provisions than large firms. See Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 32, at 3.
Different types of firms may also be differentially affected by particular loan arrangements
for purposes of improving firm value.
159
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

